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Abstract
Privacy preservation is becoming an increasingly important issue in data mining
and machine learning. In this paper, we consider the privacy preserving features of
distributed subgradient optimization algorithms. We first show that a well-known
distributed subgradient synchronous optimization algorithm, in which all agents
make their optimization updates simultaneously at all times, is not privacy pre-
serving in the sense that the malicious agent can learn other agents’ subgradients
asymptotically. Then we propose a distributed subgradient projection asynchronous
optimization algorithm without relying on any existing privacy preservation tech-
nique, where agents can exchange data between neighbors directly. In contrast to
synchronous algorithms, in the new asynchronous algorithm agents make their op-
timization updates asynchronously. The introduced projection operation and asyn-
chronous optimization mechanism can guarantee that the proposed asynchronous
optimization algorithm is privacy preserving. Moreover, we also establish the opti-
mal convergence of the newly proposed algorithm. The proposed privacy preserva-
tion techniques shed light on developing other privacy preserving distributed opti-
mization algorithms.
Keywords: Privacy preservation, distributed optimization, asynchronous optimiza-
tion.
1 Introduction
Distributed optimization and learning have attracted much research attention in recent
years due to their wide applications in engineering, machine learning, data mining and
∗This work is supported by grants from the National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars
(NSFC No. 71025005), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC No. 71401163; NSFC
No. 71433001), National Program for Support of Top-Notch Young professionals, and the Fundamental
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operations research [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 19, 20]. In a centralized design, all data
collected from the studied problem needs to be transmitted to a central location. However,
this transmission mechanism may incur prohibitively high cost. A desirable way is to
accomplish the optimization or learning task in a distributed setting, in which each agent
takes partial knowledge about this task and all agents can exchange data with their
neighbors via an underlying network graph.
A widely studied problem is the sum objective optimization problem min
∑n
i=1 fi,
where fi is agent i’s objective function and can be known only by agent i [1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8,
13, 14, 15]. This group of agents can solve the optimization problem in a cooperative way
by agents’ local optimization updates and local data sharing between neighbors. Nedic
and Ozdaglar proposed a distributed subgradient algorithm with a constant stepsize to
solve this sum objective optimization problem and presented a convergence error between
the generated estimates and the optimal objective value in terms of model parameters
in [1]. Then Nedic et. al proposed a distributed subgradient time-varying stepsize algo-
rithm to solve a more general sum objective constrained optimization problem in [2]. The
optimal convergence was established under mild assumptions of boundedness of subgra-
dients, joint connectivity of network graphs and the classical stochastic approximation
conditions. Duchi et al. proposed a dual averaging algorithm, where various sharp conver-
gence bounds as a function of the network size and network graphs were provided in [6].
Moreover, distributed alternating direction method of multipliers were also studied with
faster convergence rate compared to gradient-based algorithms in [7, 8].
In these existing distributed optimization algorithms [1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8], in order to
accomplish the task agents need to share their data with their neighbors. However, this
may lead to privacy disclosure. Privacy preservation is becoming an increasingly important
issue in applications involving sensitive data, especially in distributed settings [24, 25].
Clearly, it is desirable that on one hand, agents can jointly solve the optimization problem,
while on the other hand, agents’ privacy can be effectively preserved. In fact, some work
have also been done on designing privacy preserving algorithms to solve optimization
problems [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
The existing privacy preserving methods can be roughly classified into two classes:
cryptograph-based approaches [27] and non-cryptograph-based approaches [17, 19, 21, 22,
26]. In cryptograph-based methods, many mechanisms are designed to encrypt the data
needed to be transmitted and decrypt the received data so that the privacy is not disclosed.
The low efficiency of cryptograph-based methods has motivated much research on devel-
oping non-cryptograph-based methods. An important non-cryptograph-based method is
the ε-differential privacy approach [17, 19, 21, 26], which typically employs a randomiza-
tion perturbation method. An disadvantage of this approach is that the sensitivity of the
2
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considered algorithm is usually hard to accurately estimate, and then in order to ensure
the pre-specified privacy preserving level quantified by ε, the added random noise is re-
quired to have higher covariance, which in return degrades the optimality significantly
[18].
In this paper, we will consider the privacy preserving features of distributed subgradi-
ent optimization algorithms. Agents’ privacy may refer to the parameters in the objective
functions [18], convex constraint sets [21] or the subgradients of objective functions [16].
Similar to [16], in this paper the subgradients of agents’ objective functions are defined
as agents’ privacy that needs to be protected. In our problem domain, we assume that
there is a macilious agent that does not follow the algorithm truthfully and can transmit
any data to its neighbors. This malicious agent will keep a record of all data shared with
its neighbors in order to discover other agents’ subgradients.
We will first show that in the well-known distributed subgradient synchronous opti-
mization algorithm in which all agents make their optimization updates simultaneously,
the malicious agent can asymptotically discover other agents’ subgradients for almost all
adjacency matrices when this malicious agent can communicate with all other agents and
the stepsize is diminishing. In this sense this synchronous optimization algorithm is not
privacy preserving. Then we will design a new distributed subgradient projection asyn-
chronous optimization algorithm and establish its optimal convergence. Different from the
existing synchronous algorithms where all agents make their optimization updates simul-
taneously after taking a weighted average of the received data from their neighbors, in our
asynchronous algorithm at each time all agents make their optimization updates asyn-
chronously and the optimization update time sequences are different for different agents.
When currently some agent does not make its own optimization update, this agent just
takes the weighted average of the received data from its neighbors as the next step’s
estimate without any optimization update. Moreover, we also artificially introduce a pro-
jection set, which combines with the asynchronous optimization update mechanism can
effectively prevent the privacy disclosure. The main contribution of this paper is that we
show that the well-known distributed subgradient synchronous optimization algorithm
is not privacy preserving under some cases, and propose a new privacy preserving dis-
tributed subgradient projection asynchronous optimization algorithm without employing
any cryptograph-based and differential privacy technique following detailed convergence
analysis.
Our work is closely related to the recent work [16], in which Yan et al. considered the
privacy preservation problems of their proposed distributed subgradient online learning
synchronous optimization algorithm and showed that their algorithm has intrinsic privacy-
preserving properties. The authors also presented the necessary and sufficient conditions
3
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to ensure the privacy preserving properties. Different from the work by Yan et al. [16],
we consider the static distributed optimization instead of dynamical (online learning)
optimization in order to highlight the main contribution. In fact, the current results can
be generalized to the dynamical cases. In this paper, we relax the assumption that the
malicious agent knows the adjacency matrix of the network graph used in [16] considering
that in practice any agent is hard to obtain this adjacency matrix, especially in large
scale networks and distributed settings. Compared with [1, 2, 5], besides the optimal
convergence, we also consider the privacy preserving properties of distributed algorithms.
Moreover, different from the cryptograph-based and differential privacy techniques studied
in [17, 19, 21, 22, 26, 27], the data in our algorithm can be transmitted directly between
neighbors and we do not use any additional privacy preservation technique to disguise
agents’ data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some preliminaries
on the well-known distributed subgradient synchronous optimization algorithm (DSSOA)
and the problem formulation of the interested privacy preservation problems. In Subsec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2, we consider the adjacency matrix discovery problems of a special case of
DSSOA, i.e., the distributed consensus algorithms, and the DSSOA, respectively. In Sec-
tion 4, we present our privacy preserving distributed subgradient projection asynchronous
optimization algorithm and establish its optimal convergence. Finally, some concluding
remarks are given in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
In this section, we first introduce a well-known distributed subgradient synchronous op-
timization algorithm and then state the interested privacy preserving problems of this
algorithm.
2.1 A Distributed Subgradient Synchronous Optimization Al-
gorithm
Consider a network consisting of n agents with node set V = {1, ..., n}. The communication
among agents can be described by a directed graph G = (V, E), where arc (j, i) ∈ E means
that agent i can receive the data sent by agent j. Here node j is said to be node i’s neighbor
if (j, i) ∈ E . Let Ni = {j|(j, i) ∈ E} denote the set of node i’s neighbors. Associated with
graph G, there is usually a nonnegative adjacency matrix A¯ = (aij) ∈ Rn×n to characterize
the weights among agents, where the entries aij are nonnegative and aij is positive if and
only if (j, i) ∈ E . Graph G is said to be strongly connected if there exists a path from i to
4
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j for each pair of nodes i, j ∈ V. The objective of this network is to cooperatively solve
the sum optimization problem
min
x∈Rm
n∑
i=1
fi(x) (1)
where fi : R
m → R is the convex objective function of agent i to be minimized. In a
distributed setting, each agent only knows its own objective function.
A possible algorithm for solving (1) is the following distributed subgradient syn-
chronous optimization algorithm (DSSOA) [1]:
xi(k + 1) =
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)− αkdi(k), k ≥ 0, di(k) ∈ ∂fi(xi(k)), i = 1, ..., n, (2)
where xi(k) is agent i’s estimate for the optimal solution of (1) at time k; 0 < αk ≤ α∗ is
the stepsize, α∗ > 0; ∂fi(xi(k)) is the subdifferential that contains all subgradients of fi at
xi(k). In algorithm (2), before agents generate their estimates at the next step, they first
take a weighted average of the estimates received from their neighbors, and then make an
optimization update following a negative gradient direction. Here we say that algorithm
(2) is synchronous since all agents make their optimization updates simultaneously.
Remark 2.1 In [1], Nedic and A. Ozdaglar proposed the algorithm (2) with a constant
stepsize αk ≡ α to solve optimization problem (1), where the convergence error between
agents’ estimates and the optimal function value is presented in terms of the constant
stepsize and some other algorithm parameters. In [2], Nedic et al. considered a more
general constrained optimization problem minx∈K
∑n
i=1 fi(x) and proposed a distributed
subgradient projection algorithm
xi(k + 1) = PK
(∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)− αkdi(k)
)
, k ≥ 0
with a time-varying stepsize. Following this, many distributed subgradient algorithms emerge
under various scenarios, for example, to deal with inexact subgradients with errors [3] and
random network graphs [4, 14].
We next introduce three basic assumptions on the connectivity of the network graph,
adjacency matrix and the boundedness of subgradients [1, 2, 5, 9, 16].
Assumption 1: The graph G is strongly connected.
Assumption 2: The adjacency matrix A¯ is doubly stochastic, i.e.,
∑n
j=1 aij =
∑n
j=1 aji =
1 for all i.
Assumption 3: The subgradients of fi are bounded, i.e., there is L > 0 such that
sup
q∈
⋃
i ∂fi(x)
|q| ≤ L, ∀x ∈ Rm,
5
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here we use | · | to denote the Euclidean norm of a vector in Rm.
Although each agent only knows its own objective function, surprisingly this simple
weighted average information exchange mechanism can make the network achieve an op-
timal consensus, as indicated in the following theorem, which can be found in Proposition
2 in [2].
Theorem 2.1 Consider DSSOA (2) with Assumptions 1, 2, 3,
∑∞
k=0 αk =∞ and
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k <
∞. Then the network will achieve an optimal consensus, i.e., there exists x∗ ∈ argmin
∑n
i=1 fi
such that limk→∞ xi(k) = x
∗, i = 1, ..., n.
2.2 Problem Formulation
In algorithm (2), agents need to share their data (the estimates for the optimal solutions)
with their neighbors in order to solve the sum objective optimization problem. This direct
information exchange may lead to privacy leakage. Recently, privacy preservation becomes
an increasingly important issue in machine learning and data mining fields in distributed
settings.
It is desirable that on one hand, agents can jointly accomplish the desired task, while
on the other hand, agents’ private information can be effectively protected. However, most
of the existing distributed optimizations algorithms including the subgradient algorithm
(2) mainly focus on the algorithm design and optimal convergence analysis, but not the
privacy preservation problems (referring to those algorithms in [1, 2, 5, 6]) except the
ε-differentially private methods, in which typically a random perturbation technique is
used to prevent privacy disclosure [17, 19, 21] and cryptograph-based methods [27]. A
disadvantage of differentially private methods is that the sensitivity of the studied algo-
rithm is extremely hard to accurately estimate, and consequently, it is necessary that the
added noise has higher covariance for ensuring the desired privacy preservation level. This
in return degrades the optimality significantly. Moreover, it is usually a trade-off between
the desired privacy accuracy requirement specified by the parameter ε and the optimality
of the solutions. Moreover, a main disadvantage of cryptograph-based methods is that
agents need to encrypt the data needed to be shared and decrypt the received data from
their neighbors frequently, which incurs in low efficiency.
In this paper, we define agents’ subgradients as their private information, similar to
the setting in [16]. In our problem domain, we assume there is a malicious agent that
may not follow the algorithm truthfully and can transmit any data to its neighbors. We
call those agents that follows the algorithm truthfully as regular agents. The malicious
agent will keep a record of all the exchanged data with its neighbors and try to discover
its neighbors’ subgradients.
6
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In this paper, we are interested in the following two problems:
(i) Is the existing distributed synchronous algorithm (2) privacy preserving in the sense
that the malicious agent can discover other agents’ subgradients based on the exchanged
data between neighbors?
(ii) If algorithm (2) is not privacy preserving, can we design a privacy preserving
distributed subgradient algorithm that does not employ any cryptograph-based and dif-
ferentially private technique?
For the first problem, in Section 3 we will investigate the privacy preserving features
of the DSSOA (2), in which information are shared directly between neighbors and all
agents make their optimization updates simultaneously. The results show that for almost
all adjacency matrices the malicious agent can learn the adjacency matrix of the network
graph asymptotically when this malicious agent can receive all other agents’ estimates.
This implies that DSSOA (2) is not privacy preserving since this malicious agent can
discover other agents’ subgradients by some simple calculations.
For the second problem, in Section 4 we will propose a new distributed subgradient
projection asynchronous optimization algorithm, in which agents first take a weighted
average of the received estimates from their neighbors and then either make an optimiza-
tion update following a subgradient direction to generate the next step’s estimates or
just take the weighted average as the next step’s estimates. Different from DSSOA (2), in
the newly proposed asynchronous optimization algorithm, agents make their optimization
updates asynchronously and the optimization time sequences for different agents may be
different. This newly proposed asynchronous optimization mechanism and the introduced
projection set can effectively protect agents’ subgradient information.
3 Adjacency Matrix Discovery
In this section, we investigate the adjacency matrix discovery problem of DSSOA (2).
Clearly, if the malicious agent can obtain the adjacency matrix of the network graph and
observe all other regular agents’ estimates, then the malicious node can discover other
agents’ subgradients by simple subtraction calculations by noticing that the stepsizes for
all agents are the same in synchronous algorithm (2). We will first consider the adja-
cency matrix discovery problem of distributed consensus algorithms, which is a special
case of DSSOA (2) with trivial objective functions, and establish some necessary and
sufficient conditions to ensure that the adjacency matrix can/cannot be discovered. Then
for DSSOA (2) we will show that the malicious agent can discover the adjacency matrix
asymptotically under mild conditions by transmitting some appropriate data sequence to
other regular agents.
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In the work by Yan et al. [16], it is assumed that the malicious agent knows the
adjacency matrix in advance. Different from it, here we do not enforce this assumption
since in practice, usually it is extremely hard to obtain this adjacency matrix, especially
in large scale directed networks, taking into account the following two reasons: first,
the adjacency matrix captures the global network information and then generally agents
cannot obtain it in a distributed setting; second, agents are not willing to leak the weights
assigned to their neighbors to other agents from the viewpoint of privacy preservation.
In this section, we without loss of generality assume that agent n is the malicious
agent, agents 1, 2, ..., n − 1 (regular agents) are the malicious agent’s neighbors and the
induced subgraph generated by all regular agents is strongly connected.
3.1 A Special Case: Distributed Consensus Algorithms
In this subsection, we first consider a special case of DSSOA (2) with trivial (constant)
objective functions. In this case, algorithm (2) induces to
xi(k + 1) =
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k), i = 1, ..., n, k ≥ 0. (3)
Without loss of generality, in this subsection we assumem = 1 for notational simplicity.
Next we will investigate whether the malicious agent n can discover the adjacency matrix
based on the exchanged data with other agents. Note that the malicious agent does not
follow the algorithm truthfully and can transmit any data to all other regular agents
with the aim to discover other agents’ subgradient information. Let {u(k)}k≥0 be a data
sequence that the malicious agent n transmits to other agents (i.e., xn(k) = u(k) for all
k ≥ 0). Partition adjacency matrix A¯ into
A¯ =
(
A b
∗ ∗
)
,
b = (a1n, ..., a(n−1)n)
′ ∈ Rn−1, A ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1),
where ′ denotes the transpose of a vector. Then we rewrite (3) as a compact form:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + bu(k), k ≥ 0, (4)
where x(k) = (x1(k), ..., xn−1(k))
′. We also denote b = (b1, ..., bn−1)
′ for simplicity. In con-
trol community, (4) is referred to as a single-input control system. Note that bi > 0 for all i
since we assume in this section that all regular agents are the malicious agent’s neighbors.
When there is no confusion, here we roughly call the weight pair (A, b) describing the
weights within regular agents and that between regular agents and the malicious agent as
the adjacency matrix. In the following, we formally introduce the definition of adjacency
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matrix discovery. Recall that a vector is said to be a stochastic vector if it is nonnegative
and the sum of its components is one, and a matrix is said to be a stochastic matrix if all
its rows are stochastic vectors.
Definition 3.1 (Adjacency Matrix Discovery) We say that the adjacency matrix
(A, b) of (4) cannot be discovered by the malicious agent if there exists another stochastic
matrix (A∗, b∗) 6= (A, b) with each component of b∗ being positive such that for any sequence
{u(k)}k≥0, x∗(k) = x(k) for all k ≥ 0, where {x∗(k)}k≥0 are the estimates generated by
the algorithm
x∗(k + 1) = A∗x∗(k) + b∗u(k), k ≥ 0
with x(0) = x∗(0), and can be discovered by the malicious agent otherwise.
Theorem 3.1 The adjacency matrix (A, b) of algorithm (4) cannot be discovered if and
only if the following matrix equations with variable z have at least two solutions:{
(A− z)Akb = 0, k = 0, 1, ..., n− 2,
(A− z)Akx(0) = 0, k = 0, 1, ..., n− 2,
subject to z ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1), (z, b) is a stochastic matrix.
Proof. (Necessity). According to the definition of adjacency matrix discovery, there
exists another stochastic matrix (A∗, b∗) 6= (A, b) such that the two estimate sequences
generated by algorithm (4) with respective (A, b) and (A∗, b∗) are identical for any sequence
{u(k)}k≥0. Then
(A− A∗)x(k) + (b− b∗)u(k) = 0, k ≥ 0.
As a result, b = b∗, and consequently, (A − A∗)x(k) = 0 for any k ≥ 0. Therefore,
(A − A∗)x(0) = 0. From (A − A∗)x(1) = 0 and x(1) = Ax(0) + bu(0), we can find
that (A − A∗)b = 0 and (A − A∗)Ax(0) = 0. Analogously, from (A − A∗)x(2) = (A −
A∗)(A2x(0) + Abu(0) + bu(1)) we can obtain that (A− A∗)Ab = 0, (A− A∗)A2x(0) = 0.
Other equations can be obtained in a similar way.
(Sufficiency). The sufficiency can be shown directly from the sufficiency condition and
the fact that each Ak, k ≥ n − 1 can be expressed as a linear combination of Ar, r =
0, 1, ..., n− 2. We complete the proof. 
Let span{p1, ..., pℓ} and rank{p1, ..., pℓ} denote the subspace generated by vectors
p1, ..., pℓ, and the rank of vectors p1, ..., pℓ, respectively. Also let 1 denote the vector of all
ones in Rn−1. The following two corollaries can be obtained directly from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1 If
span
{
1, b, Ab, ..., An−2b, x(0), Ax(0), ..., An−2x(0)
}
= Rn−1, (5)
then the adjacency matrix (A, b) of algorithm (4) can be discovered.
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Corollary 3.2 If single-input control system (4) is completely controllable (equivalently,
rank(b, Ab, ..., An−2b) = n − 1), then the adjacency matrix (A, b) of algorithm (4) can be
discovered.
From Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 we can find that for almost all adjacency matrices except
a zero Lebesgue measure weight set, the adjacency matrix (A, b) of algorithm (4) can be
discovered by the malicious agent. The following is a necessary and sufficient condition
that the adjacency matrix can be discovered for a special class of graphs.
Theorem 3.2 Assume there is a node i, i 6= n in graph G such that each node j, j 6=
i, j 6= n is a neighbor of this node. Then the adjacency matrix (A, b) of algorithm (4) can
be discovered if and only if (5) holds.
Proof. The sufficiency can be obtained from Corollary 3.1. We now show by contradiction
the necessity. We assume without loss of generality that nodes 2, ..., n − 1 are node 1’s
neighbors. As a result, all components of the first row of A, which is denoted as a, are
positive. Select a nonzero vector c ∈ span{1, b, Ab, ..., An−2b, x(0), Ax(0), ..., An−2x(0)}⊥
with sufficiently small components such that all components of a − c are positive (⊥
denotes the orthogonal complement of a subspace). Then the matrix z with the first row
being a− c and all other rows are the same as that of A is also a solution of the matrix
equations in Theorem 3.1. This contradicts Theorem 3.1 and then the necessity follows.
The proof is completed. 
We next present a necessary and sufficient condition when the network contains three
agents.
Theorem 3.3 Consider algorithm (4) with a completely connected graph and n = 3. Then
the adjacency matrix (A, b) of algorithm (4) cannot be discovered if and only if b1 = b2,
x1(0) = x2(0) and a11 + a12 = a21 + a22.
Proof. The sufficiency is straightforward. In fact, when the sufficient conditions hold, any
nonnegative matrix
(
z1 z2
z3 z4
)
satisfying z1 + z2 = z3 + z4 = a11 + a12 is a solution of
the matrix equations in Theorem 3.1. Now we show the necessity by contradiction. Hence
first suppose x1(0) 6= x2(0). Then from (A− z)x(0) = 0 and (z, b) is a stochastic matrix,
we have that a11x1(0) + a12x2(0) = z1x1(0) + z2x2(0) and a11 + a12 = z1 + z2. That is,(
x1(0) x2(0)
1 1
)(
a11 − z1
a12 − z2
)
= 0.
The above equation implies that z1 = a11, z2 = a12 due to x1(0) 6= x2(0). Similarly, we
can show z3 = a21, z4 = a22. This implies that the matrix equations in Theorem 3.1 has
10
Lou et al. Privacy Preservation in Distributed Subgradient Algorithms
a unique solution, which yields a contradiction. Then x1(0) = x2(0). Analogously, from
(A−z)Ax(0) = 0 we can also prove that the two entries of Ax(0) are the same. Therefore,
it follows that a11 + a12 = a21 + a22. From the first matrix equation in Theorem 3.1 we
can also show that b1 = b2 in a similar way. The proof is completed. 
We now consider the problem the malicious agent how to discover the adjacency matrix
(A, b) by choosing an appropriate sequence {u(k)}k≥0 when condition (5) holds.
Theorem 3.4 Assume (5) holds. Then the adjacency matrix (A, b) of distributed algo-
rithm (4) can be discovered by choosing
u(0) = u(1) = · · · = u(n− 2) = 0,
u(n− 1) = · · · = u(2n− 2) = 1.
Proof. From Corollary 3.1 we know that the adjacency matrix (A, b) of algorithm (4) can
be discovered when (5) holds. Clearly, by (4) we have the matrix equation(
1, x(1), ..., x(n), x(n+ 1), ..., x(2n− 1)
)
=
(
A, b
)(1 x(0) · · · x(n− 1) x(n) · · · x(2n− 2)
1 u(0) · · · u(n− 1) u(n) · · · u(2n− 2)
)
=
(
A, b
) (
1 x(0) · · · An−1x(0) +
∑
n−2
r=0
An−2−rbu(r) Anx(0) +
∑
n−1
r=0
An−1−rbu(r) · · · A2n−2x(0) +
∑2n−3
r=0
A2n−3−rbu(r)
1 u(0) · · · u(n− 1) u(n) · · · u(2n− 2)
)
Rewrite the above matrix equation as Z =
(
A, b
)
Y . If matrix Y has full row rank, then(
A, b
)
is uniquely determined by
(A, b) = ZY ′(Y Y ′)−1.
Note that the square matrix Y Y ′ is invertible if and only if Y is full row rank. We next
show that the matrix Y has full row rank under condition (5) by choosing u(0), ..., u(2n−2)
given in this theorem.
By letting u(0) = u(1) = · · · = u(n− 2) = 0 and u(n− 1) = · · · = u(2n− 2) = 1 in Y
yields the matrix
(
1 x(0) Ax(0) · · · An−2x(0) An−1x(0) Anx(0) + b · · · A2n−2x(0) +
∑2n−3
r=n−1
A2n−3−rb
1 0 0 · · · 0 1 1 · · · 1
)
(6)
Noticing that any Ak, k ≥ n − 1 can be expressed as a linear combination of I (the
identity matrix), A, ..., An−2, we can find that the matrix in (6) is certainly full row rank.
We complete the proof. 
3.2 Adjacency Matrix Discovery of DSSOA
In this subsection, we consider the adjacency matrix discovery problem of DSSOA (2).
Clearly, (2) can be written as the following compact form:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + bu(k)− ε(k), k ≥ 0, (7)
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where ε(k) = (ε1(k), ..., εn−1(k))
′, εi(k) = αkdi(k).
We first present a useful lemma for the following analysis.
Lemma 3.1 Assume Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold. Then the estimates xi(k), i, k generated
by algorithm (7) are bounded if the u(k), k ≥ 0 transmitted by the malicious agent to other
agents are bounded.
Proof. By Assumption 3, we have |εi(k)| ≤ αkL ≤ α
∗L. It is also easy to see ||A||∞ :=
max1≤i≤n−1
∑n−1
j=1 aij = max1≤i≤n−1(1−bi) < 1. From (7) by induction we have x(k+1) =
Ak+1x(0)+
∑k
r=0A
k−r(bu(r)− ε(r)), k ≥ 0. The proceeding three relations imply that for
any k,
||x(k + 1)||∞ ≤ ||A||
k+1
∞ ||x(0)||∞ +
k∑
r=0
||A||k−r∞
(
u∗ + α∗L
)
≤ ||x(0)||∞ +
u∗ + α∗L
1− ||A||∞
<∞,
where u∗ := supk≥0 |u(k)| is a finite number by hypothesis. Then the proof is completed.

Theorem 3.5 Consider distributed algorithm (7) with Assumptions 1, 2, 3. Suppose
rank(b, Ab, ..., An−2b) = n − 1 and limk→∞ αk = 0. Then the adjacency matrix (A, b)
of algorithm (7) can be discovered asymptotically by choosing an appropriate sequence
{u(k)}k≥0.
Proof. Denote sr,k = r(2n−1)+k, r ≥ 0, k = 0, ..., 2n−2 and let u(sr,0) = u(sr,1) = · · · =
u(sr,n−2) = 0, u(sr,n−1) = u(sr,n) = · · · = u(sr,2n−2) = 1 for each r ≥ 0. Similar to the
analysis in the proof of Theorem 3.4,
(
A, b
)
= ZrY
′
r (YrY
′
r )
−1 +
(
0, ε(sr,1 − 1), ..., ε(sr,2n−1 − 1)
)
Y ′r (YrY
′
r )
−1, (8)
where Zr =
(
1, x(sr,1), x(sr,2), ..., x(sr,2n−1)
)
, Yr has the same definition as the matrix given
in (6) by replacing x(0) with x(sr,1−1). We can find that if rank(b, Ab, ..., An−2b) = n−1,
then YrY
′
r is full row rank and hence the inverse (YrY
′
r )
−1 exists.
By Lemma 3.1, the estimates xi(k), i, k are bounded. Then YrY
′
r , r ≥ 0 are bounded
and as a result, we can show by contradiction that (YrY
′
r )
−1, r ≥ 0 are also bounded based
on the following two conclusions:
(i) If BrCr = I (the identity matrix) for any r and limr→∞Br = B, where the inverse
B−1 exists, then limr→∞Cr = B
−1;
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(ii) Under the rank condition rank(b, Ab, ..., An−2b) = n− 1, the inverse of YrY ′r exists
for any x(sr,1 − 1) when we view YrY ′r as a matrix function with variable x(sr,1 − 1) in a
bounded closed set.
The boundedness of (YrY
′
r )
−1, r ≥ 0 combines with the hypothesis condition limk→∞ αk =
0 imply that the second term in (8) tends to zero. Then we conclude that (A, b) can be dis-
covered asymptotically in the sense that limr→∞ |ZrY ′r (YrY
′
r )
−1−(A, b)| = 0. We complete
the proof. 
We can find that the diminishing stepsize condition limk→∞ αk = 0 given in Theorem
3.5 naturally holds under the condition
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k < ∞, which is sufficient by Theorem
2.1 and somehow necessary for the optimal convergence of subgradient almorithms. The
result in theorem 3.5 implies that the synchronous optimization algorithm (2) is not
privacy preserving in the sense that the malicious agent can discover the adjacency ma-
trix and then other agents’ subgradients asymptotically by choosing an appropriate data
sequence transmitted to other regular agents. In fact, according to the proof of Theo-
rem 3.5, limr→∞Ar = A, limr→∞ br = b, where (Ar, br) is the matrix pair such that
ZrY
′
r (YrY
′
r )
−1 := (Ar, br). Then we can find that regular agents’ subgradients at any time
k can be obtained approximately by
Arx(k) + bru(k)− x(k + 1)
αk
with sufficiently large r. Under the assumption that the malicious agent knows the adja-
cency matrix, Yan et al. showed that the malicious agent can discover other regular agents’
subgradients if and only if all other regular agents are the malicious agent’s neighbors [16].
This is consistent with our result.
4 A Distributed Subgradient Projection Asynchronous
Optimization Algorithm
In last section, we showed that when the malicious agent can observe all other regular
agents’ estimates, for almost all adjacency matrices except a zero Lebesgue measure weight
set, DSSOA (2) is not privacy preserving in the sense that the adjacency matrix and then
regular agents’ subgradients can be discovered by the malicious agent asymptotically. In
this section, we will propose a new privacy preserving distributed subgradient projection
asynchronous optimization algorithm and strictly establish its optimal convergence.
The main design idea of the newly proposed privacy preserving distributed subgradient
projection asynchronous optimization algorithm is that agents make their optimization
updates asynchronously and we artificially introduce a projection set in the estimate
iterations.
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Distributed Subgradient Projection Asynchronous Optimization Algorithm:
xi(k + 1) =


PX
(∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)−
1
r
di(k)
)
,
if k = κi(r) for some r;
PX
(∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)
)
, otherwise,
k ≥ 0, (9)
where PX denotes the convex projection operator, κi(r) is the time when agent i makes its
r-th time optimization update, {κi(r)}r≥1 is referred to as agent i’s optimization update
time sequence, which is deterministic and only known by agent i. Note that in algorithm
(9) agents make their optimization updates asynchronously and the optimization update
time sequences are different for different agents. Here we artificially introduce a bounded
convex projection setX , which is known by all agents and contains all the optimal points of
min
∑n
i=1 fi. We can find that both the optimal solutions of min
∑n
i=1 fi and minX
∑n
i=1 fi
are identical.
In asynchronous algorithm (9), after taking a weighted average of the estimates re-
ceived from its neighbors, each agent will take a subgradient optimization step and a
projection onto set X to generate the estimate at the next step if the current time is
this agent’s optimization update time, and will just take the projection of the weighted
average onto set X as the estimate at the next step otherwise. Here agent i’s optimization
update time sequence {κi(r)}r≥1 can be given by agent i in advance before algorithm
execution, and can also be correspondingly defined depending on whether agents make
their optimization updates at k ≥ 0.
Remark 4.1 In algorithm (9), after taking a weighted average of the estimates received
from their neighbors and before generating the estimates at the next step, agents choose to
make an optimization update or not. That is, agents make their optimization updates just
at some times. In fact, this intermittent optimization update mechanism have appeared in
the literature, for instance, [10, 12, 13, 14, 15]. In [13, 14, 15] agents choose to make their
optimization updates or not randomly, and the stepsize is random and taken as the inverse
(or the power of the inverse) of the number of all optimization update times up to the
current time. Different from them, the stepsize is deterministic in our algorithm. In fact,
we can find that the randomized unconstrained optimization algorithms are not privacy
preserving in some sense since based on the results in last section, the malicious node can
discover other agents’ stepsizes and then the subgradients with a positive probability if the
malicious agent takes the full knowledge of the adjacency matrix and can observe all other
agents’ estimates.
Remark 4.2 The stepsize choice is extremely important for the optimal convergence of
distributed subgradient algorithms. In fact, Theorems 4.2 and 4.4 in [9] show that for a
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network graph with doubly stochastic adjacency matrix, the optimal convergence of the sum
objective function may be not achieved if the stepsizes are different for different agents.
In fact, both the left eigenvector of adjacency matrix and the stepsizes determine the
weighted sum objective function to be minimized. However, the results in last section show
that the identical stepsize design and simultaneous optimization update mechanism make
synchronous algorithm (2) not privacy preserving. In the new asynchronous algorithm (9),
the stepsize is taken as the inverse of the times that agents make their optimization updates
up to the current time, similar to that in [13, 14, 15]. The following result shows that the
optimal convergence can still be guaranteed provided that for each agent, the number of its
optimization update times is the same over different time intervals with the same length.
Remark 4.3 In cryptograph-based methods [27], agents need to encrypt the estimates
needed to be shared with their neighbors and decrypt the received estimates so that agents’
privacy cannot be disclosed. In differential privacy methods [17, 19, 21, 22, 26], agents
need to add random noises on the estimates needed to transmitted to protect agents’ pri-
vacy. Different from them, in our algorithm (9), the estimates can be transmitted directly
between neighbors without any additional technique to disguise agents’ estimates. It reveals
that only the asynchronous optimization update mechanism can ensure that the proposed
algorithm is privacy preserving.
Remark 4.4 In algorithm (9), for the unconstrained optimization problem min
∑n
i=1 fi,
we artificially introduce a projection set from the viewpoint of privacy preservation. We can
find that algorithm (9) also works for the constrained optimization problem minK
∑n
i=1 fi,
where X can be taken as a subset that contains all the optimal solutions of minK
∑n
i=1 fi.
In fact, the authors in [16] have shown that in presence of projection set, the malicious
agent cannot discover the subgradients for any network graph in their model.
4.1 Privacy Preserving Properties
Before establishing the optimal convergence of algorithm (9), in this subsection we first
roughly illustrate that algorithm (9) is privacy preserving from the two aspects of projec-
tion set X and asynchronous optimization update mechanism.
First, when agents’ “estimates”
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)−
1
r
di(k) locate outside the projection
set X , from the property of convex projection operator
PX(z) = PX
(
PX(z) + λ(z − PX(z))
)
1, ∀z 6∈ X, λ ≥ 0,
1This property of convex projection operator follows from the fact that w = PX(z) if and only if
(z − w)′(y − w) ≤ 0 for any y ∈ X . This fact can be shown directly from the definition of convex
projection.
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we know that the malicious agent cannot infer other agents’ subgradients at time k based
on its received estimates even though the malicious agent knows the adjacency matrix,
while when they locate inside set X , algorithm (9) evolves in the form:
xi(k + 1) =


∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)−
1
r
di(k),
if k = κi(r) for some r;∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k), otherwise.
This also reveals that the malicious agent cannot discover other agents’ subgradients at
time k based on the following reasons. On one hand, even if the adjacency matrix (A, b)
has been obtained by the malicious agent and the malicious agent can observe all other
regular agents’ estimates, but note that since the malicious agent does not know whether
regular agents i, i 6= n make their optimization updates at time k, so in this asynchronous
algorithm, knowing xi(k+1)−
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k) cannot help the malicious agent discover the
subgradients; on the other hand, even if the malicious agent also knows that agent i makes
its optimization update at time k, which helps the malicious agent discover 1
r
di(k) from
xi(k + 1)−
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k), but this malicious agent still cannot discover the subgradient
since it does not know the stepsize 1/r considering that the optimization update time
sequences are different for different agents and each agent only knows its own update
time sequence.
As a sum, we can roughly conclude that when agents are far from the projection
set X , both the projection set and the asynchronous optimization update mechanism
can effectively protect agents’ privacy and when agents are close to the desired optimal
solution x∗ ∈ argmin
∑n
i=1 fi (the optimal convergence will be proven in the following
Theorem), it is the asynchronous optimization update mechanism that mainly protects
agents’ privacy.
4.2 Optimal Convergence
In this subsection, we will establish the optimal convergence of the newly proposed asyn-
chronous projection optimization algorithm (9). We next make an assumption on agents’
optimization update time sequences {κi(r)}r≥1, i = 1, ..., n.
Assumption 4: There exists an integer T > 0 such that for each agent i, 1 ≤ ti(r1) =
ti(r2) <∞, ∀r1, r2, where
ti(r) =
∣∣∣{s∣∣rT ≤ κi(s) < (r + 1)T}∣∣∣
denotes the times of agent i’s optimization updates on interval [rT, (r + 1)T ).
Assumption 4 requires that each agent makes its own optimization update with a
constant number of times within any time interval with some fixed common length. Note
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that the numbers of optimization updates within the time interval with the fixed length
may be different for different agents. We can see that Assumption 4 holds if each agent
makes its optimization update in a periodic way, no matter whether the periods of agents’
optimization updates are the same.
We now establish the optimal convergence of algorithm (9).
Theorem 4.1 (Optimal Convergence) Consider distributed subgradient projection asyn-
chronous optimization algorithm (9) with Assumptions 1, 2 and 4. Then the network will
achieve an optimal consensus, i.e., there exists x∗ ∈ argmin
∑n
i=1 fi such that limk→∞ xi(k) =
x∗, i = 1, ..., n.
Proof. First it follows from xi(k) ∈ X that
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k) ∈ X by Assumption 2 and the
convexity of X . Then for k ≥ 1, algorithm (9) can be re-written as
xi(k + 1) =


∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k) + ωi(k),
if k = κi(r) for some r;∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k), otherwise,
(10)
where
ωi(k) = PX
(∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)−
1
r
di(k)
)
−
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k).
Here we still use L to denote the upper bound of subgradients of objective functions,
L := sup
q∈
⋃
x∈X,i ∂fi(x)
|q|,
which is a finite number due to the boundedness of X and the convexity of fi. This implies
that Assumption 3 holds. Therefore,
|ωi(k)| ≤
1
r
|di(k)| ≤
1
r
L
and then it follows from Assumption 4 that limk→∞ |ωi(k)| = 0, where we use the property
of convex projection operator |PX(y)− z| ≤ |y − z| for any y ∈ Rm and z ∈ X2 and the
fact that
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k) ∈ X . As a result, algorithm (9) will achieve a consensus, i.e.,
limk→∞ h(k) = 0 by Theorem 1 in [23], where
h(k) = max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)|.
2This property of convex projection operation comes from Lemma 1 (b) in [2].
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Let x∗ ∈ argminX
∑n
i=1 fi. Then by applying the similar analysis for distributed sub-
gradient algorithms in [1, 2, 9], we have that when k = κi(r) for some r,
|xi(k + 1)− x
∗|2
=
∣∣∣PX(∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)−
1
r
di(k)
)
− x∗
∣∣∣2
≤
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)−
1
r
di(k)− x
∗
∣∣∣2
≤
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)− x
∗
∣∣∣2 + |di(k)|2
r2
−
2
r
(xi(k)− x
∗)′di(k) +
2L
r
∣∣∣xi(k)−∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)
∣∣∣
≤
∑
j∈Ni
aij
∣∣xj(k)− x∗∣∣2 + L2
r2
−
2
r
(
fi(xi(k))− fi(x
∗)
)
+
2L
r
∣∣∣xi(k)−∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)
∣∣∣
≤
∑
j∈Ni
aij
∣∣xj(k)− x∗∣∣2 + L2
r2
−
2
r
(
fi(x¯(k))− fi(x
∗)
)
+
2L
r
(∣∣xi(k)−∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)
∣∣ + |xi(k)− x¯(k)|)
≤
∑
j∈Ni
aij
∣∣xj(k)− x∗∣∣2 + L2
r2
−
2
r
(
fi(x¯(k))− fi(x
∗)
)
+
4L
r
h(k),
where x¯(k) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi(k) denotes the average of agents’ estimates at time k. Moreover,
when k 6= κi(r) for any r, we have
|xi(k + 1)− x
∗|2 =
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k)− x
∗
∣∣∣2 ≤ ∑
j∈Ni
aij |xj(k)− x
∗|2.
Summarizing the above two cases, we have
|xi(k + 1)− x
∗|2 ≤
∑
j∈Ni
aij
∣∣xj(k)− x∗∣∣2 + χi,k(L2
r2
−
2
r
(
fi(x¯(k))− fi(x
∗)) +
4L
r
h(k)
)
,
where
χi,k =
{
1, if k = κi(r) for some r;
0, otherwise
Taking the sum of the above inequality over i = 1, ..., n, by the double stochasticity in
Assumption 2 we have
n∑
i=1
|xi(k + 1)− x
∗|2 ≤
n∑
i=1
|xi(k)− x
∗|2 +
n∑
i=1
χi,k
(L2
r2
−
2
r
(
fi(x¯(k))− fi(x
∗)
)
+
4L
r
h(k)
)
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As a result,
n∑
i=1
|xi((s+ 1)T )− x
∗|2 ≤
n∑
i=1
|xi(sT )− x
∗|2 +
(s+1)T−1∑
k=sT
n∑
i=1
χi,k
L2
r2
−
(s+1)T−1∑
k=sT
n∑
i=1
χi,k
2
r
(
fi(x¯(k))− fi(x
∗)
)
+
(s+1)T−1∑
k=sT
n∑
i=1
χi,k
4L
r
h(k)
:=
n∑
i=1
|xi(sT )− x
∗|2 + µ1(s) + µ2(s) + µ3(s) (11)
We next estimate the sum of the second, third and fourth term in (12) over s ≥ 1.
Then by the condition ti(s1) = ti(s2) for all s1, s2 in Assumption 4, we have
∞∑
s=1
µ1(s) =
∞∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
L2(
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1) + r
)2
≤
∞∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
ti(s)L
2(
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1)
)2
=
∞∑
s=1
1
s2
n∑
i=1
L2
ti(0)
<∞ (12)
We also have
µ2(s) = −
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
2
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1) + r
(
fi(x¯(κi(ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1) + r)))− fi(x
∗)
)
= −
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
2
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1)
(fi(x¯(sT ))− fi(x
∗))
−
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
2
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1)
(fi(x¯(κi(ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1) + r)))− fi(x¯(sT )))
−
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
( 2
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1) + r
−
2
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1)
)
× (fi(x¯(κi(ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1) + r)))− fi(x
∗))
≤ −
2
s
n∑
i=1
(fi(x¯(sT ))− fi(x
∗))
+
n∑
i=1
2Lti(s)
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1)
max
sT≤r<(s+1)T
|x¯(r)− x¯(sT )|
+
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
2Lr
(ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1))2
max
sT≤r<(s+1)T
|x¯(r)− x∗|. (13)
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Taking the average of the two sides of (10), by Assumption 2 we have
x¯(k + 1) = x¯(k) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
χi,kωi(k)
and then
max
sT≤r<(s+1)T
|x¯(r)− x¯(sT )| ≤
(s+1)T−2∑
k=sT
1
n
n∑
i=1
χi,k|ωi(k)|
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
L
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1) + r
≤
L
s
.
This implies
∞∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
2Lti(s)
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1)
max
sT≤r<(s+1)T
|x¯(r)− x¯(sT )|
≤
∞∑
s=1
2L2n
s2
<∞ (14)
Moreover, we also have
∞∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
2Lr
(ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1))2
max
sT≤r<(s+1)T
|x¯(r)− x∗|
≤
∞∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
2Lζr
(ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1))2
≤
∞∑
s=1
1
s2
n∑
i=1
2Lζ
(ti(0))2
(1 + ti(0))ti(0)
2
<∞, (15)
where ζ = supsmaxsT≤r<(s+1)T |x¯(r) − x
∗| < ∞ by the boundedness of X and the fact
x¯(r) ∈ X . Combining with (13), (14) and (15) together, we have
∞∑
s=1
(
µ2(s) +
2
s
n∑
i=1
(fi(x¯(sT ))− fi(x
∗))
)
<∞. (16)
By the similar arguments given in the proof of Lemma 4.3 in [9], we can also show
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that
∞∑
s=1
µ3(s) ≤
∞∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
ti(s)∑
r=1
4L
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1) + r
max
sT≤k<(s+1)T
h(k)
≤
∞∑
s=1
n∑
i=1
4Lti(s)
ti(0) + · · ·+ ti(s− 1)
max
sT≤k<(s+1)T
h(k)
=
∞∑
s=1
4Ln
s
max
sT≤k<(s+1)T
h(k) <∞. (17)
By (11), (12), (16) and (17), we have
n∑
i=1
|xi((s+ 1)T )− x
∗|2 ≤
n∑
i=1
|xi(sT )− x
∗|2 −
2
s
n∑
i=1
(fi(x¯(sT ))− fi(x
∗))
+ µ1(s) + µ2(s) +
2
s
n∑
i=1
(fi(x¯(sT ))− fi(x
∗)) + µ3(s)
with
∞∑
s=1
(
µ1(s) + µ2(s) +
2
s
n∑
i=1
(fi(x¯(sT ))− fi(x
∗)) + µ3(s)
)
<∞.
Then we conclude that the limit lims→∞ |xi(sT )−x
∗|2 exists and
∑∞
s=1
2
s
∑n
i=1(fi(x¯(sT ))−
fi(x
∗)) <∞. Since
∑∞
s=1
2
s
=∞,
lim inf
s→∞
n∑
i=1
(fi(x¯(sT ))− fi(x
∗)) = 0.
Let {x¯(srT )}r≥0 be a subsequence of {x¯(sT )}s≥0 such that limr→∞
∑n
i=1(fi(x¯(s
rT ))−
fi(x
∗)) = 0. From the boundedness of {x¯(srT )}, we know that there exists a subsequence
{x¯(srkT )}k≥0 of {x¯(s
rT )}r≥0 such that the limit limk→∞ x¯(s
rkT ) = xˆ exists. Therefore,
it follows from the continuity of fi and the closedness of X that xˆ ∈ argminX
∑n
i=1 fi.
By replacing x∗ with xˆ, we can also similarly show that the limit lims→∞
∑n
i=1 |xi(sT )−
xˆ|2 exists. This combines with limk→∞ x¯(srkT ) = xˆ and what we have shown that the
consensus is achieved imply that lims→∞
∑n
i=1 |xi(sT )− xˆ|
2 = 0.
We complete the proof. 
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the privacy preserving features of distributed subgradient op-
timization algorithms. We first show that an existing distributed subgradient synchronous
optimization algorithm is not privacy preserving in the sense that the malicious agent can
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learn other agents’ subgradients asymptotically for almost all adjacency matrices except
a zero Lebesgue measure weight set. We also proposed a new distributed subgradient
projection asynchronous optimizaiton algorithm, in which agents make their own opti-
mization updates asynchronously and each agent only knows its own optimization update
time sequence. The artificially introduced convex projection set and the asynchronous
optimization mechanism can effectively protect agents’ private information. Moreover,
we also shown the optimal convergence of the newly proposed asynchronous algorithm.
Other interesting problems, including investigating privacy preserving properties of other
distributed optimization algorithms such as subgradient random algorithms [13, 14, 15],
dual averaging algorithm [6] and ADMM [7, 8], and developing other privacy preserv-
ing algorithms using the proposed privacy preservation techniques in this paper, are still
under investigation.
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